In the 2018 elections, Putin promised a “Russia for the people“: that was his slogan. In the almost four years since, however, he has done little. He has changed the constitution so he can remain in office until 2036; he has made some highly unpopular reforms to the pension system; he has poisoned and imprisoned his critic and competitor Alexej Navalny. But he has not managed to initiate a political movement to his benefit. His popularity is eroding perceptibly.

The Kremlin does not need the people. Putin does not have to ask anyone’s permission. However, his strength does stem from his appeal to the people, his ability to win them over and mobilise them. That legitimises his actions. This appeal is now weaker than it was in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea. The people have grown as tired of the propaganda and threats of war as they are of corruption and the difficult economic situation. He had to do something with a view to the 2024 elections. That’s why he is trying, with the support of state media, to whip up nationalistic frenzy and foment Russian nationalism into a siege mentality.

Yes, of course. During Donald Trump’s term in the White House, Putin came to the realisation that he must bring Russia back into the mix in the power play between the US and China. And since Joe Biden began his term, a person as despised in the Kremlin as all other Democratic US presidents, he seems to believe now is the right time. However, it is important to remember that Putin thinks long term. He has been President since 2000 and can remain in office until 2036.

Following what was widely perceived as the traumatic humiliation of the collapse of the Soviet empire, Putin is doing everything he can to prevent the continued fragmentation of Russia and to reverse the trend through new territorial expansion. In doing so, he follows the thinker Lev Gumilyov in the pseudo-scientific idea that every nation has its own life energy, and that Russia's superior nature as a young, new country filled with cosmic power calls for continued expansion.

The Tsars expanded Russian territory step by step. The Soviet Union adopted the same approach; it is not for nothing that the conquest of space happened during the Soviet era. That is real and deeply symbolic at the same time: the Russian reaching for the stars. There has been a messianism in Russian culture since at least the 16th century. Russia thus considers itself entrusted with a universal civilising mission at certain moments in its history.

It may not reflect public opinion, but it does touch on something deep within the Russian culture. They have this dangerous idea that they are really special and therefore entitled to show or prove something to the world. It’s no coincidence that Russia turned into the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was an idea, a concept.

Yes, the West of all places, which is old, tired and drained according to Gumilyov’s theory, i.e. its life energy is on the wane. Putin is constantly spreading the narrative of the outrage of Russia being pushed into a corner and kept down. He says the West wanted to prevent Russia from regaining the greatness that belonged to the nation by right.

Yes, exactly that.

Neither. Nevertheless, Putin’s foreign policy is reminiscent of the Tsars and Stalin. It’s all driven by this paranoia that goes back to his KGB training.

No. Putin understands how intellectually disoriented the Russian people have been since the fall of the Soviet Union. The people had lived with Marxism-Leninism for 70 years. And even if they didn’t believe in it, they were still shaped by this ideology, as was Putin himself. Putin is now offering them a new ideological narrative that gives them stability. Putinism plays on various sensitivities that are meaningful in Russia, for example when he identifies with Orthodox Christianity, which was largely suppressed during the Soviet era, with Russian ethnicity, the sublime Slavic soul, or Eurasianism, according to which Russia should turn towards Asia.

Essential components of this Putinism are conservatism, anti-Americanism and the rejection of all political correctness. The common thread in this patchwork is hatred of the decadent West, imperialism and readiness for war. However, Putin wants to use this message not only to bring his own people on board, but to win over the whole world. This export mentality, so to speak, distinguishes this ideology from the doctrines of other authoritarian states like China or Iran.

Spirituality. The Russians have a strong idealistic streak. As Putin sees it, they have a religious, compassionate soul and are ready to die. “In Russia, even death is still beautiful,” says a proverb that Putin likes to quote. In his view, we in the rich West are materialists, we only care about our comfort. We know no patriotism, no willingness to sacrifice, we don’t fight for anything.

Putin‘s ideology is a sacralisation of war. We have been observing a militarisation of Russian society for several years. Children receive a basic patriotic education in school and learn how to handle weapons. And the military is celebrated. Just look at the Central Armed Forces Museum in Moscow, a cathedral to the military adorned with frescoes and mosaics, with tanks and planes on display, or at the March of the Immortal Regiment every 9 May. Every family is urged to join the march and carry photos of ancestors who died in the war in front of them. In addition, there is the collective memory of the Second World War. The people are proud of their victory.

Putin entirely ignores the involvement of the Western allies. And he expects gratitude from the West for the Soviet soldiers having defeated National Socialism. As he doesn't get it the way he wants, his thoughts turn to revenge.

It’s hard to imagine Russia without Putin these days. However, there are of course possible successors in his entourage, and the danger is that these people will think like he does. Take Sergei Schoigu, for example.

Yes. Only the Russians themselves can really answer whether Putinism can exist without Putin. He may have already set the course institutionally, economically and mentally. He may also already have succeeded in convincing people that the idea matters more than the reality. There may, however, also be an awakening, by the time he has gone, if not before, when people understand that his ideology was a mere illusion and that their country lost more than it gained under him and his ideology.